Month: November 2025

Universals, & quantifiers.

Published on November 18, 2025

There were many things from this lesson that were new. Things that seemed like we were splitting hairs on: e.g. universals enunciated universally, or not universally, affirmation being opposed to negation contradictorily, or contrarily, the impossibility of overlapping simultaneity between these conditions, and infinite inductive regression from a universal to what is universally predicated of it, etc. Yet, I think the most humbling part of this chapter, is realizing, very quickly, of the limitation of man’s mind to know what is, or is not, inherent within a universal without a quantifier preceding it.

Without the terms “every”, “some”, “none”, etc. preceding the universal subject, and the inherent attribute being examined, it seems that man cannot make a rational, coherent, precise, and definitive determination regarding the truth, or falsity, of any enunciation made by anyone, including ourselves. For example, to say: “Man is tall”, is immediately opposed in our minds by: “Man is not tall”; yet, neither idea can be confirmed, or denied. Both have a certain degree of truth in them, but may also not be true, depending on the context; but, to enunciate the universal without a quantifier seems to open up a door to nowhere. This principle, of a universal not being enunciated universally, seems to beg the man to speak rightly of things that can be known by the reason that has been given to him by God. Our Lord, and Savior, Jesus Christ’s exhortation to us on this, hits harder now, than it did upon my first reading of it:

“But let your speech be yea, yea: no, no: and that which is over and above these, is of evil.” (Matthew 5:37)

As I go further with this, I’m getting the impression that logic is not for the sloppy, or the faint of heart, this was a very difficult chapter to work through and humiliating to grapple with. The following verses keep coming to mind the further I go with Aristotle:

“For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain. For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things. And hardly do we guess aright at the things that are upon the earth: and with labour do we find the things that are before us. But the things that are in heaven, who shall search out?” (Wisdom of Solomon 9:14-16)

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 7.

A priori (causality), & its five modes.

Published on November 15, 2025

Aristotle commences this lesson concerning a priori and causality being of 5 modes:

The 1st being according to time: e.g. this is more ancient than that, this is older than that, etc.

The 2nd being according to discrete existence: e.g. 1 is prior to 2 but does not necessarily cause 2 to exist.

The 3rd being according to individual order: e.g. elements are prior to syllables in Grammar, proem is prior to the narration in discourses, etc.

The 4th being according to esteem: e.g. the married man holds his wife, and children, in higher esteem than a stranger.

The 5th being according to prior causality: e.g. the existing subject is the cause of, and is prior to, the true sentence asserting that it exists.

I think this lesson demonstrated to me my lack of command over the category named “relative”. I struggled to grapple with paragraph 7, which seemed to really hinge on reciprocation. I began to ask myself, “What reciprocates? The only thing I remember is relative from Aristotle, and peculiarity from Porphyry.” What made it more confusing is that he referred to mode 3, “For of those which reciprocate according to the consequence of existence (mode 3, above), that which is in any respect the cause of the existence of the one, may be justly said to be prior by nature.” Yet, this shared the same language as mode 2, “In the second place, [one thing is said to be prior to another,] because it does not reciprocate according to the consequence of existing.”

So, concerning causality, we have things that do, or do not reciprocate. Those things that do reciprocate, Aristotle is referring to Mode 3, which the priority is according to individual order; yet he makes no explicit mentioning of reciprocation. Now I’m asking myself, “Do parts within a demonstrative science reciprocate? So, assuming that the parts of a predicated science are prior, and not simultaneous: then, when we speak of syllables, do these parts automatically reciprocate in any direction of abstraction deductively to elements, or inductively to the potential science of Grammar, which encompasses these things, as a whole, since that is what we are assuming?” Indeed, I searched the entire book for all the instances where the term ‘reciprocate‘ is mentioned, and they are all clustered in chapters 7, 12 & 13. Perhaps I over did it in my inquiry, but I simply didn’t have the answer to my question; eventually, I gave in to asking the tutor, which confirmed that parts within a demonstrative science do not reciprocate. Even after the tutor’s answer, I still do not fully understand why does Aristotle refer to mode 3 as being of those things which reciprocate according to the consequence of existence? My missed questions on my first attempt of the quiz confirmed my confusion of the real difference between modes 2 and 5.

All that being said, I’ve learned that mode 5 is asserting that a subject is the cause of reciprocation with things said about it, and mode 2 is asserting there are things, being discrete in of themselves, that may indeed be prior to something sequential to it, yet do not cause reciprocation. Perhaps the answer will be in the next chapter, I see that Aristotle is talking about reciprocation and simultaneity. We’ll see, maybe that chapter will help me bridge the fragmented pictures I have of what I’ve learned so far. I have a feeling that the category relative could be the key to this art of reasoning.

EAR

Aristotle, Categories, Chapter 12.

Reciprocations, & natural simultaneity.

Published on November 15, 2025

An idea is forming in my mind about all this. I could be completely wrong on everything I’m about to say; but it seems as if all these different Categories are simply describing, and classifying, what is already naturally apparent to us. A relative seems to be subverted without a subject. A quality, or position, seem to be subverted when improperly attributed to a subject in question. A species that generates from a genus, could be subverted by the genus ceasing to exist.

I went back and reviewed chapter 7, concerning the category relative, and re-read Aristotle’s words, “Such things, however, are among the number of relative, such as habit, disposition, sense, science, position.” As I worked yesterday, I thought about each kind of relative, and tried to form my own ideas with any subject. E.g. I thought about how, reciprocation between the disposition, ‘illness’, and the subject, ‘cancer patient’, is true, and obviously reciprocates: if the disposition remains with the subject and does not change. The moment it changes, like if the patient miraculously recovers from the sickness, now the reciprocation no longer holds between the subject, and the disposition; thus, they are literally no longer relative to each other.

So, it seems that relative, being naturally simultaneous, is not the cause of anything, but simply an instantaneous state between a subject, and another category; of which a third-party person reasoning, and observing, can either affirm to be true, or false. Before, I was treating relative as if it were a kind of category that identifies a single idea on its own; however, it seems that relative is concerned with two ideas: namely, a subject, and a habit, disposition, sense, science, and position.

EAR

Aristotle, Categories, Chapter 13.

Mutations.

Published on November 15, 2025

This lesson was short, but unbelievably difficult to understand; and it did not open up for me until I fully understood what mutation actually was, and its implications. In order to find the answer, I had to go back to re-read every chapter containing the term: chapter 5 on substance, chapter 8 on quality, and chapter 10 concerning opposites. After doing so, I came back to chapter 24, paragraph 6 concerning contraries, and the outline of an idea began to form in my mind of what mutation according to place could mean. I made the raw assertion to the tutor that, “… it is physically moving from, or remaining at, a location.”

The tutor confirmed my reasoning, and referred me to Aristotle’s Physics, Book V, chapters 2 through 5, and Metaphysics Book XII, chapter 1, for further reading. I went down the rabbit hole and, admittedly, much of it was far beyond my current level of reasoning, and comprehension. However, I was able to scrounge up some helpful gems along the way. I did learn from Metaphysics that there are 3 types of motion: quality, quantity, and place; Aristotle says explicitly, “If, therefore, the categories are divided by substance, quality, place, action and passion, relation and quantity, it is necessary that there should be three motions, viz. of quality, of quantity, and of place.”

From Physics, I learned that generation, and corruption, were mutations into being, and non-being, respectively; again, the Philosopher says plainly, “… for mutation is more denominated from that into which, than from that from which it is moved; and on this account, corruption is a mutation into nonbeing; though also that which is corrupted is changed from being; and generation is a mutation into being, though it should be from non-being.” Learning these two ideas, were immensely helpful in being able to classify the 6 species of motion, into 4 classifications in my mind: generation with corruption being mutations of essence, increase with diminutions being mutations of quantity, variations being mutations of quality, and mutations with rest according to place referring to locomotion, or the absence thereof.

Having discovered all that, after more prayer, more re-readings out loud, and more walking contemplations: suddenly, today, I noticed in paragraph 7, that every time Aristotle mentioned “mutation of a quality”, he was speaking of the species of motion called variation. Thus, it seemed to me that variation is what is opposed to rest according to place, and mutation of quality into a contrary quality. So, all that being said, simply put, I have learned that:

Mutation is a kind of change, of which there are different kinds, depending on the predication being made, between a subject, and its particular motion.

EAR

Aristotle, Categories, Chapter 14.

Babbling according to human compact.

Published on November 14, 2025

The following enunciation jumped out at me, in my study of this chapter, “But all speech is, indeed, significant, not as an instrument (organon), but as we have said, according to human compact.” My immediate pondering was, “Why would speech, assuming it comes from the human voice, not be considered an instrument? Is it not the very instrument, through which communication can be intelligible? The voice produces sounds, which implies it causes some kind of speech.”

I contemplated the sentence, read it many times, tried to think outside the box that was being given, and eventually decided to test my reasoning with the tutor. I asked, “Is it the because the sounds do not mean anything without human compact? If so, then that would imply that no speech, can be known, prior to human compact taking place.” The tutor affirmed my thoughts on that enunciation made by Aristotle. I then abstracted that this could imply, further proof, that the “Tower of Babel” story from Genesis actually happened, and is not metaphorical, or allegorical. It seems that it would be reasonable, with this premise, to believe that all men at one point in time spoke the same language; however, God confused their prideful speech, to which then, if they wanted to survive, that event would have necessitated for them to come together, and agree on words by compact, in order to be able to communicate.

The second thing I could not understand immediately, was when he asserts, “Thus, for instance, a prayer, is, indeed, speech, but is neither true nor false.” I wondered why this would be. So again, I attempted an abstraction and reasoned with the tutor, “Perhaps, this is because in Aristotle’s time, prayer was subjective, and not objective due to the lack of divine revelation. It seems that prayer, at that time outside of Israel, would have been a supplication addressed to a reality that was not known, and outside of what could be reasoned with.” The tutor confirmed my answer as being reasonable, and coherent according to the source. This really makes me wonder at how it must have felt, to not know, what God has revealed to us modern men by grace; and, being blessed the credibility of truth concerning the Catholic Church, the sacraments, adoption as sons of God through baptism in Jesus Christ, etc. This makes me respect pre-Christian wise men all the more, now that I am immersed in their writings. What they did, to live virtuously, and reason at this level rationally, without the help of divine revelation, is extraordinary to think about.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 4.

Sophists & semantics.

Published on November 14, 2025

While I understood the basic meaning of what Aristotle asserts, “But I say, that the enunciation of the same thing is opposed synonymously, and not homonymously, or such other particulars of this kind, as we have concluded against the annoyances of the sophists.”, I could not immediately generate examples in my mind to demonstrate this principle to myself. “What does it mean to oppose one enunciation homonymously?” I would ask myself. Perhaps, because sophists do this, with the regular intention to deceive, I would reason that they must be quite proficient in their ability to switch the meaning of a term, mid-discourse, and run with that new meaning, while leaving the other poor soul completely behind, confused, and wondering what in the world just happened. With this in mind, I attempted to pretend to be a sophist, as absurd as it was to actively think in this way:

I could assert that, ‘the night is dark’, to which a sophist would oppose, ‘the knight is not dark’.

Or, perhaps I could assert, ‘all is well (meaning good)’, to which a sophist would oppose, ‘there is no well (meaning for water)’.

Or, perhaps I could assert, ‘it is to the right of here’, to which a sophist would oppose, ‘I have nowhere to write‘, etc.

I find it most amusing, that fools pretending to be wise, were what led to the rise of Aristotle, and his Organon; which seems to be scientifically, totally, and absolutely, concerned with destroying their deceptions, while simultaneously helping man, being a rational animal, to live according to how he was designed by God: by his reasoning.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 6.

The a priori of affirmation.

Published on November 14, 2025

An invitation to ponder entered my mind when I read what Aristotle first asserts in the beginning of the chapter, “First affirmation, then negation, is one enunciative speech.” I asked myself, “Why is affirmation first?” It seemed to me, that the Philosopher was implying, that if we begin with a negative assertion about something, or someone, we cannot know the truth, or the falsity of the premise at all to begin with.

I wondered to the tutor that if this is because, “… negation, being relative to affirmation, cannot stand alone without being at risk, and subject to an indefinite metaphysical reality, and contradictions.” The tutor affirmed my assertion as being logically sound and then opened up my mind to something I was not seeing before. That affirmation, and negation, once made from an enunciation, can each then be respectively examined for truth, or falsity. This was a profound moment for me, because I was treating affirmation with truth, and negation with falsehood, as synonymous terms, or perhaps far too generally in my mind; therefore, my command over their distinctions in application was getting very muddied while attempting to employ their use with my own reasoning.

I can’t help but now wonder at the implications of this with other topics I hear all around me in my own personal life, at work, at home, in public, on the news, in the Church, etc. It seems as if I hear a lot of negative enunciations ad nauseum: e.g. “this team is not pulling their weight”, “this man is not good”, “this President is not my President”, “the Pope is not the successor to Peter”, “the Eucharist is not Jesus”, etc. Ecclesiastes 1:15, and 10:20 come to mind, and I am certainly guilty of falling into both categories, especially prior to my studies with Aristotle.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 5.