One thing I was not prepared for was coming into contact with the fluidity of contingent syllogisms. Up until now, everything has been very straightforward and rigid. Syllogisms of necessity and actuality, while the rules were difficult to understand at first, now seem like child’s play compared to the two recent chapters on contingency. The idea of conceptual conversions, how what is initially asserted as contingent could theoretically be converted to its opposing contrary, almost seems to demand that the intellect keep a bird’s eye level view of the syllogism, and does not permit one to go ‘down the rabbit hole’ as it were with these premises. To me, it almost seems to beg that one does not grant any assertion made, but to pay closer attention the key words shaping the premises: e.g. ‘it happens’, ‘it may’, it could be’, ‘contingently’, ‘perhaps it is’, etc. It is all incredibly abstract, so I hope that it will lock in with more examples for the mind to sink in and latch on to. However, I think I am beginning to notice the general pattern going on here. The prior intense studies of being extremely sensitive of the middle, practicing the mental formation of valid syllogisms in different figures, and subdividing these chapters into main ideas is paying off in a big way. I would have given up at this chapter if I had not done the necessary work prior to this. Also, the conclusion at the end, really brings all of this home. Necessary conclusions require necessary premises, and contingent premises do not warrant necessary conclusions. That is a very profound idea to ponder on. A lot of claims are made in our times, and I need to get in the habit more of challenging an asserter to provide evidence for any great assertion made; rather than just taking him for his word and now being subject to whatever rhetoric is to follow, whether it be true or false.
EAR