Tag: Aristotle

M.

Published on January 14, 2026

I think just getting past the switching of naming conventions was a huge breakthrough for me. My confusion on the actual positioning, or rather the assumed signification of M, was a mess from the beginning. My assumption of its inherent alphabetic sequencing, as if it were univocal to the function of A, and then – with that flawed assumption – tracking the conversion of the major premise as if M is now posterior to N because it was originally prior pre-conversion. All these things were distorting my perception of the premises, their relationships, and their implications to the conclusive propositions. Nothing made any sense, and it only got worse during the subsequent reductions of invalid demonstrations.

Towards the end of my intense first line-by-line study on Chapter 5, all my notes were corrupted because of this error; but after getting into another dialectical tennis match with the tutor for clarification, and wrestling past my ignorant equivocation of M as if it were the subject, instead of the predicate, finally my error revealed itself, and then the light began to shine on everything I had previously stumbled through. There was an immense clarity as I re-wrote the notes, and with the proper terms defined for ‘NMO’, viz. M being properly understood as the middle term, I could then properly understand each line from Aristotle in a way that was not apparent before. I was able to ask the tutor more intelligent, and nuanced, questions and give more logical interpretations on sentences that were difficult to understand at first glance.

EAR

Aristotle, Prior Analytics. Book I, Chapter 5.

Mnemonics.

Published on January 4, 2026

Had I not stumbled upon the mnemonic chart of syllogisms, as used by the Renaissance masters for their students at that time, I would have been utterly lost in this chapter. I honestly could not figure out, why in the world Aristotle would provide all these different examples of invalid syllogisms, and not provide one demonstration of a valid one with predefined terms from natural philosophy. I was trying to understand the point and purpose of this. Every example he provided did not make any sense to me and felt very absurd to even reason with: “Some horse is no white, no crow is a horse, therefore no crow is white.” I kept asking myself, “So what? That, ‘no crow is a horse, while some horse is not white?’ What does that have to with a crow not being white? It has nothing to with it; these things are irrelevant and prove nothing about each other.”

Learning of Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and Ferio shed light on this question. It was such a huge breakthrough for me. Once I learned their propositional order, then it became a piece of cake to simply diagram out each syllogism in my notes and see why these were not working. In fact, I was able to quickly recognize what was universal, particular, privative, categoric, and the quick determination of the validity of each demonstration. I also noticed a commonality between the four perfect first figure syllogisms: viz. B A, C B, C A. Coming back to my original conundrum of not understanding why he demonstrates these as he did: it seems that he is showing us examples that are wrong, in order to make what is true more apparent to us.

Aristotle, Prior Analytics. Book I, Chapter 4.

EAR

Conversions, & contingencies.

Published on December 19, 2025

I could not understand what the difference was between the fact that a necessary universal privative proposition is converted, and a contingent universal privative proposition is not converted. I thought that perhaps the answer would be revealed by asking figuring out why this was the case metaphysically. So, I went down the rabbit hole and tried to do an abstraction, and brought it to the tutor: “Why are universal privative propositions impossible? I reason that it is because even if A and B were not, the fact that they are, begins from somewhere, or some inductive universal predicate, or point of origin. E.g. every man is not every rock, and every rock is not every man, but both exist, and so therefore, they can’t mutually and indefinitely exclude the other into subversion.”

I overstepped myself, and the tutor tried to clarify and reel me back, while citing from Posterior Analytics, and later chapters in the Prior Analytics. I was not having any of that, so after a dialectical tennis match, I felt utterly lost, and that was not a good feeling. With a shattered brain the tutor finally brought me back to my original question, and demonstrated in a way in which clarity returned, and I could see again: “… the key difference between the conversion of necessary and contingent universal privative propositions lies in their logical necessity and how their conversion relates to syllogistic validity. First: “A is present with no B” being the necessary, and the second: “It happens that A is not present with any B” being the contingent.”

EAR

Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Book I. Chapter 3.

Asymmetry.

Published on December 17, 2025

Once I got passed the extremely subtle style of Aristotle’s demonstrations, the complex web of elements composing a proposition, and perceiving the entire treatise as being divided into four main parts, a question arose in my soul: “Why are there no universally converted affirmative universals?” I attempted to abstract the idea in my mind. It is difficult to explain what exactly I was seeing, for it wasn’t necessarily tied to any known natural dianoetic conception, but the image I got seemed to be a reduction to a single point, upon which there was simultaneous convergence, and divergence from which the entire fabric of reality flowed into, and out of.

In this painfully abstract image, I noticed something: it was not symmetrical, but asymmetrical. For it seemed that what is universal can only regress to something more universal, and likewise whatever is particular can only progress to something more particular. This seemed to be simply the way things are. I abstracted further, “Then what would symmetrical look like with this image?” I attempted to assert the condition in my mind, and whatever fabric of reality I was seeing, seemingly flatlined, immediately subverted, and then there was nothing. I didn’t know exactly what to interpret from this at first, but after pondering on it, the answer seemed to come up from the depths of my soul, I took it to the tutor: “Asymmetry allows for potency.” The tutor replied: “This asymmetry is important because it preserves the logical potency and prevents contradictions. If universal affirmatives converted universally, it would collapse distinctions between categories and make reasoning unreliable. In short, the lack of universal conversion of universal affirmatives allows for logical structure and potency by maintaining asymmetry in predication, which aligns with Aristotle’s syllogistic framework.”

So, I have learned that universal propositions seem to scale and model the logical deduction of predications that exist with what is, and the rational soul, with reasoning, through Aristotle, now has a way to coherently express these in proposition, with precision.

EAR

Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Book I, Chapter 2.

Ex nihilo.

Published on December 16, 2025

At first, the main ideas of this chapter were not immediately apparent to me on my first two introductory light reads. I was trying to organize it into parts but was not understanding how to divide the chapter. I think my field of view was too deductive, or narrow, having just come out of On Interpretation. It wasn’t until I began the process of taking careful notes and working through each line, that the main ideas revealed themselves: proposition, term, syllogism. It seemed as if Aristotle just picked me up by the collar from the ground, while I was in the middle of looking at the individual grains of sand, and showed me the bigger picture of the beach we were standing on, or at least to be aware of it. The terms form the proposition, the proposition forms the syllogism, and the syllogism signifies the reasoning, and perhaps the deeper meaning beyond it.

Everything after that, as far as comprehension were concerned, was locked into place, and it was not difficult to organize my notes. My question to the tutor then became: “Is this structural framework (proposition, term, syllogism) necessary to penetrate the truth of reality?” The simple answer was “Yes… this framework is fundamental to Aristotle’s theory of knowledge and demonstration, as it enables the penetration of truth by logically deriving conclusions from primary truths.” My reply was: “Then it seems to me that rational minds are incapable of omniscience, and creating anything from nothing, but rather coming to know what is, and what was; also, coming to fabricate, or form new things from what is, and what was, created prior to Man’s existence, am I correct? It seems as if Man was put into a reality, which he can come to know, and interact with, but could not create himself. In fact, it seems as if nothing tangible, or intangible, whether physical, or intellectual, would be something outside of, or in addition to, the given and designed capacity, or potency, of what could be.

So, i.e. rational minds must have been designed to employ this framework: to be aware of the truth, to investigate the truth, the know the truth, to be protected by the truth, and to teach the truth. The truth is, what is, as God has it to be. In His omniscience, it seems that he gave us the power to be able to come to know the energy of His will, which is what is. So, therefore, logic seems to be an invitation to walk with Him, to penetrate the truth, be transformed by the truth, and perfected by the truth.”

The tutor replied and introduced me to a new term: “The intellect does not bring into being new essences or realities from nothing but discovers and works with what is. Therefore, your understanding that man is placed in a reality where he can know, interact with, and form new things from what is pre-existing, but cannot create himself or reality ex nihilo (from nothing), aligns well with Aristotle’s philosophy as presented in these classical texts.”

EAR

Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Book I, Chapter 1.

Deception.

Published on December 14, 2025

The seventh passage from this final chapter of On Interpretation was very subtle. I nearly glossed over and missed what Aristotle was conveying here about deception. The passage was very short, he says: “But in those things in which there is deception [contraries are to be admitted]; and these are things from which there are generations. Generations, however, are from opposites; and, therefore, deceptions also.” In my mind, I immediately recalled that generation is motion away from what was. As I abstracted, I imagined something becoming something else, like a baby becoming an adult.

Deception, in the way that Aristotle put it, seemed to go in the opposite direction, as if there was an induction happening. So, what is now, the reality, is being asserted as the same as what it was, or what it never was. Using that same image before, it’s as if to assert:
“The adult is a baby”. I took this interpretation to the tutor: “Concerning deception, it seems that generation is opposed to what was, and therefore the distance between the two contraries is apparent to all; but deception seems to be the assertion of a contrary inductively under the other contrary and being of the opinion that they are univocal, when they are actually equivocal.”

The tutor confirmed my interpretation as aligning well with Aristotle and added that sophistical fallacies blur the distance between contraries, thereby obscuring reality. I came up with examples to demonstrate this deception being employed: “astrology is astronomy”, “abortions are equal rights”, “witchcraft is natural philosophy”, “communism is social justice”, “capitalism is charity”, “affairs are love”, etc.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 14.

Fire, & first essences.

Published on December 13, 2025

The end of this chapter seems to be an invitation for deeper ponderings about: ‘what was’, ‘what is’, and ‘what could be’. Firstly, Aristotle’s demonstration of what fire is, that it is: an irrational power, with no will to affect any kind of opposite contrary to its nature, and a first essence. It is quite different for me to invert my direction of abstraction concerning this. I’ve always assumed, with respect to fire, that it is what heats other things. It would seem that such an enunciation would be common sense. However, on the contrary, according to Aristotle, it seems that any mutation suffered by others in proximity to fire, is not because fire has the power of heating, but because other things have the power to be heated, or rather to suffer being heated. This is a very different way of looking at a subject’s relationship with an irrational power.

Also, the implication of there being a first essence provokes a deep pondering with me. The question that came to my mind was: “What other first essences are there?” If fire is one, then another must be something that is also elemental in nature. The first that came to my mind was water, but I wasn’t confident if perhaps air, and earth would also be among these too. I took these to the tutor, who confirmed my thoughts, but took them further: “While [these] four elements are foundational as first essences of sensible bodies, Aristotle also discusses: eternal essences, immovable essences, mathematical forms, numbers, intelligible essences, principles of change, etc.”

I’m left at an impasse at this point, with more questions that I don’t have answers to: “What energized these first essences? Do these irrational powers mix compositely in any kind of way? Do they lose their essential distinctions at any point? Can they experience mutation, and if so, do they merely become one of the other first essences?”

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 13.

“It is not necessary not to be.”

Published on December 5, 2025

The content presented in this lesson was fairly difficult, but straightforward; however, the implications of what was being said, with regards of nuanced additions to verbs, was extremely subtle, perhaps too deep, and fine, at this point for me to abstract on with any hope of staying rooted to reality. I suppose it will become clearer in the next few chapters, maybe more examples, and demonstrations, will be provided. We’ll see.

Firstly, this jumped out at me from Aristotle, “In a similar manner of this [enunciation] it is necessary to be, the negation is not this, it is necessary not to be, [the negation] is this, it is not necessary not to be.” I asked myself, and the tutor, “Why is this different from the rule that affirmations and negations center around the verb, with the subject’s positive or negative condition? Why is this different from the other enunciations? Is it because if something is ‘to be’, then it was by necessary causes? Likewise, if it was ‘not to be’, then it was not necessary for any prior causes to generate what never existed in the first place?”

The tutor explained that my interpretation was in line with Aristotle, but qualified it further, “‘Necessary’ in the absolute sense is connected to prior causality… Conversely, ‘necessary not to be’ would indicate absolute impossibility or absence of prior causality for existence… Between these extremes lies contingency, which Aristotle expresses logically as ‘not necessary not to be.’ Contingent things are neither necessarily existent nor necessarily non-existent.”

So, I am now perceiving the past and present conditions as being necessary; and what is not necessary, as being open to the future. I don’t fully understand what this all means, it’s like seeing an island on the horizon while out at sea; but, not seeing that island up close, in full focus, and with full understanding of what it is that you are looking at.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 12.

The hinge.

Published on November 29, 2025

In this chapter, Aristotle speaks of the primary substance being a composite of predicates, the essences of which are apparent of the subject, and while each can be affirmed of the substance individually, they retain their distinction essentially; and, while the particulars are accidental to the substance itself, they are, like the predicates, distinct from other particulars, and not accidental to each other.

What is the implication here? It seems that we keep returning to what was taught in the Categories, that nothing holds, or makes any sense without the primary substance. I think Aristotle is implying that if we are talking of essential things, then we are merely defining the subject in question, but if we are talking of particular things, then we are describing that same subject in motion. None of the particulars seem to make any sense without the subject, and certainly truth cannot be found without the noun. Likewise, none of the essentials seem to make sense without a subject either. I tried to abstract and imagine these predicates, and particulars, detached from the primary substance, and simply could not do it. My intellect is unable to see the genus animal without thinking of a species within it; and, I cannot imagine an attribute, like running, being removed from some kind of substance to animate the action. Inductively starting from the particulars leads to infinite possibilities, and deductively starting from the predicates leads to an indefinite mess of forms that are not distinct.

My mind is seeing the substance as a kind of hinge, or convergence point where the defining predicates, and describing particulars, seem to exist instantaneously as the substance does:

They don’t seem to flow into, or flow out from the substance. What is generated, or corrupted of the substance seems to existentially, and directly, effect both predicates and particulars. As we speak of these things, I reason that interpreting what is apparent of what we speak of, is knowing rightly what can be said of it, or about it.

E.g. “What is this animal? A Tiger. Where is it? In the wild. Doing what? Hunting for prey. When did you see it? Yesterday. So, now we have something to ascertain the truth of viz. ‘yesterday, we saw a tiger in the wild, hunting for prey’. If you subvert the tiger, then ‘yesterday’, ‘wild’, ‘hunting for prey’ are no longer apparent and subverted.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation. Chapter 11.

Deduction, & Induction.

Published on November 23, 2025

This lesson was fairly straightforward as I analyzed the different logical forms of enunciations, their oppositions, etc. However, as I proceeded toward the end of the chapter, the following question came to my mind: “Is there not a universally assumed universal enunciation that is logical and true?” I stopped what I was doing and attempted to abstract in different ways to find my own example. However, it seemed like the moment I put the term “every”, or “all” in front of the subject, the logical coherence, of what I was about to assert with respect to the theoretical predicate, fell apart in pieces. I tried many different things: “Every cloud is grey. False, some clouds are white.”, “Every bird flies. False, some birds can’t fly.”, “Every star gives light. False, some stars are dead.”, and it went on, and on. Finally, I came to the only thing I could think of, “all demons are evil”. I took to this to the tutor, who responded, “evil is the privation of something originally good; therefore, demons were once angels, created for good, who then deprived themselves of their originally good nature. This is a nuanced inquiry that belongs to St. Thomas Aquinas rather than Aristotle.”

I responded: “Then, there is no universally assumed universal enunciation that is true. It’s impossible to demonstrate an example, and nothing works.” The tutor answered:

“That is not true, for example: all men are mortal.”

This is true, all men are indeed mortal. Then it hit me, I suddenly realized that this whole time, I was trying to universally assume particulars to universals, which is obviously irrational; because, if something is particular, then surely it can be assumed that what is particular is infinite in potentiality. So, then my mind switched to inductive abstractions, and I saw the difference: “Every man is a substance. True.”, “Every tree is a living body. True.”, “Every intellect, and every angel is incorporeal. True, and true.”

“A wise heart shall acquire knowledge: and the ear of the wise seeketh instruction.” – Proverbs 18:15

In XC, with Sts. Sebastian, Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great & Bartolo Longo,

Eddie

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 11.