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Tag: Categories

A priori (causality), & its five modes.

Published on November 15, 2025

Aristotle commences this lesson concerning a priori and causality being of 5 modes:

The 1st being according to time: e.g. this is more ancient than that, this is older than that, etc.

The 2nd being according to discrete existence: e.g. 1 is prior to 2 but does not necessarily cause 2 to exist.

The 3rd being according to individual order: e.g. elements are prior to syllables in Grammar, proem is prior to the narration in discourses, etc.

The 4th being according to esteem: e.g. the married man holds his wife, and children, in higher esteem than a stranger.

The 5th being according to prior causality: e.g. the existing subject is the cause of, and is prior to, the true sentence asserting that it exists.

I think this lesson demonstrated to me my lack of command over the category named “relative”. I struggled to grapple with paragraph 7, which seemed to really hinge on reciprocation. I began to ask myself, “What reciprocates? The only thing I remember is relative from Aristotle, and peculiarity from Porphyry.” What made it more confusing is that he referred to mode 3, “For of those which reciprocate according to the consequence of existence (mode 3, above), that which is in any respect the cause of the existence of the one, may be justly said to be prior by nature.” Yet, this shared the same language as mode 2, “In the second place, [one thing is said to be prior to another,] because it does not reciprocate according to the consequence of existing.”

So, concerning causality, we have things that do, or do not reciprocate. Those things that do reciprocate, Aristotle is referring to Mode 3, which the priority is according to individual order; yet he makes no explicit mentioning of reciprocation. Now I’m asking myself, “Do parts within a demonstrative science reciprocate? So, assuming that the parts of a predicated science are prior, and not simultaneous: then, when we speak of syllables, do these parts automatically reciprocate in any direction of abstraction deductively to elements, or inductively to the potential science of Grammar, which encompasses these things, as a whole, since that is what we are assuming?” Indeed, I searched the entire book for all the instances where the term ‘reciprocate‘ is mentioned, and they are all clustered in chapters 7, 12 & 13. Perhaps I over did it in my inquiry, but I simply didn’t have the answer to my question; eventually, I gave in to asking the tutor, which confirmed that parts within a demonstrative science do not reciprocate. Even after the tutor’s answer, I still do not fully understand why does Aristotle refer to mode 3 as being of those things which reciprocate according to the consequence of existence? My missed questions on my first attempt of the quiz confirmed my confusion of the real difference between modes 2 and 5.

All that being said, I’ve learned that mode 5 is asserting that a subject is the cause of reciprocation with things said about it, and mode 2 is asserting there are things, being discrete in of themselves, that may indeed be prior to something sequential to it, yet do not cause reciprocation. Perhaps the answer will be in the next chapter, I see that Aristotle is talking about reciprocation and simultaneity. We’ll see, maybe that chapter will help me bridge the fragmented pictures I have of what I’ve learned so far. I have a feeling that the category relative could be the key to this art of reasoning.

EAR

Aristotle, Categories, Chapter 12.

Reciprocations, & natural simultaneity.

Published on November 15, 2025

An idea is forming in my mind about all this. I could be completely wrong on everything I’m about to say; but it seems as if all these different Categories are simply describing, and classifying, what is already naturally apparent to us. A relative seems to be subverted without a subject. A quality, or position, seem to be subverted when improperly attributed to a subject in question. A species that generates from a genus, could be subverted by the genus ceasing to exist.

I went back and reviewed chapter 7, concerning the category relative, and re-read Aristotle’s words, “Such things, however, are among the number of relative, such as habit, disposition, sense, science, position.” As I worked yesterday, I thought about each kind of relative, and tried to form my own ideas with any subject. E.g. I thought about how, reciprocation between the disposition, ‘illness’, and the subject, ‘cancer patient’, is true, and obviously reciprocates: if the disposition remains with the subject and does not change. The moment it changes, like if the patient miraculously recovers from the sickness, now the reciprocation no longer holds between the subject, and the disposition; thus, they are literally no longer relative to each other.

So, it seems that relative, being naturally simultaneous, is not the cause of anything, but simply an instantaneous state between a subject, and another category; of which a third-party person reasoning, and observing, can either affirm to be true, or false. Before, I was treating relative as if it were a kind of category that identifies a single idea on its own; however, it seems that relative is concerned with two ideas: namely, a subject, and a habit, disposition, sense, science, and position. 

EAR

Aristotle, Categories, Chapter 13.

Mutations.

Published on November 15, 2025

This lesson was short, but unbelievably difficult to understand; and it did not open up for me until I fully understood what mutation actually was, and its implications. In order to find the answer, I had to go back to re-read every chapter containing the term: chapter 5 on substance, chapter 8 on quality, and chapter 10 concerning opposites. After doing so, I came back to chapter 24, paragraph 6 concerning contraries, and the outline of an idea began to form in my mind of what mutation according to place could mean. I made the raw assertion to the tutor that, “… it is physically moving from, or remaining at, a location.”

The tutor confirmed my reasoning, and referred me to Aristotle’s Physics, Book V, chapters 2 through 5, and Metaphysics Book XII, chapter 1, for further reading. I went down the rabbit hole and, admittedly, much of it was far beyond my current level of reasoning, and comprehension. However, I was able to scrounge up some helpful gems along the way. I did learn from Metaphysics that there are 3 types of motion: quality, quantity, and place; Aristotle says explicitly, “If, therefore, the categories are divided by substance, quality, place, action and passion, relation and quantity, it is necessary that there should be three motions, viz. of quality, of quantity, and of place.”

From Physics, I learned that generation, and corruption, were mutations into being, and non-being, respectively; again, the Philosopher says plainly, “… for mutation is more denominated from that into which, than from that from which it is moved; and on this account, corruption is a mutation into nonbeing; though also that which is corrupted is changed from being; and generation is a mutation into being, though it should be from non-being.” Learning these two ideas, were immensely helpful in being able to classify the 6 species of motion, into 4 classifications in my mind: generation with corruption being mutations of essence, increase with diminutions being mutations of quantity, variations being mutations of quality, and mutations with rest according to place referring to locomotion, or the absence thereof.

Having discovered all that, after more prayer, more re-readings out loud, and more walking contemplations: suddenly, today, I noticed in paragraph 7, that every time Aristotle mentioned “mutation of a quality”, he was speaking of the species of motion called variation. Thus, it seemed to me that variation is what is opposed to rest according to place, and mutation of quality into a contrary quality. So, all that being said, simply put, I have learned that:

Mutation is a kind of change, of which there are different kinds, depending on the predication being made, between a subject, and its particular motion.

EAR

Aristotle, Categories, Chapter 14.