Tag: Catholic Church

Juggling.

Published on November 24, 2025

It seems that all men are afflicted with the bane of priorities. How many balls can be juggled? Which ball is the most important not to drop? Should one move forward, stay still, alter orientation, or go backwards, while juggling? Is one still juggling many, even when he thinks he is juggling many, though someone else points out to him, that he is only juggling one, with everything else he thought he was juggling, lieth on the ground? Is this juggling?

The temptation seems to be, once one knows that his order of juggling was, and still is, disordered, then the temptation to stop juggling, and only juggle one, intensifies. Or, perhaps man is given these particular balls to juggle, and is told these are what’s necessary, and to juggle them as best you can, and if you can do so, then you will grow as a man.

Then maybe, we are called not to pour all of our attention into one ball, and not the one in our hand, or the other, but the one, or ones, that we acted upon, and are floating mid-air. For can a juggler truly, really, perceive all the balls simultaneously in the air?

Deduction, & Induction.

Published on November 23, 2025

This lesson was fairly straightforward as I analyzed the different logical forms of enunciations, their oppositions, etc. However, as I proceeded toward the end of the chapter, the following question came to my mind: “Is there not a universally assumed universal enunciation that is logical and true?” I stopped what I was doing and attempted to abstract in different ways to find my own example. However, it seemed like the moment I put the term “every”, or “all” in front of the subject, the logical coherence, of what I was about to assert with respect to the theoretical predicate, fell apart in pieces. I tried many different things: “Every cloud is grey. False, some clouds are white.”, “Every bird flies. False, some birds can’t fly.”, “Every star gives light. False, some stars are dead.”, and it went on, and on. Finally, I came to the only thing I could think of, “all demons are evil”. I took to this to the tutor, who responded, “evil is the privation of something originally good; therefore, demons were once angels, created for good, who then deprived themselves of their originally good nature. This is a nuanced inquiry that belongs to St. Thomas Aquinas rather than Aristotle.”

I responded: “Then, there is no universally assumed universal enunciation that is true. It’s impossible to demonstrate an example, and nothing works.” The tutor answered:

“That is not true, for example: all men are mortal.”

This is true, all men are indeed mortal. Then it hit me, I suddenly realized that this whole time, I was trying to universally assume particulars to universals, which is obviously irrational; because, if something is particular, then surely it can be assumed that what is particular is infinite in potentiality. So, then my mind switched to inductive abstractions, and I saw the difference: “Every man is a substance. True.”, “Every tree is a living body. True.”, “Every intellect, and every angel is incorporeal. True, and true.”

“A wise heart shall acquire knowledge: and the ear of the wise seeketh instruction.” – Proverbs 18:15

In XC, with Sts. Sebastian, Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great & Bartolo Longo,

Eddie

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 11.

To be, or not to be.

Published on November 22, 2025

This was a mind-bending chapter, that seemed to stretch my intellect above, beyond, and through my prior limitations, and comprehensions.

Firstly, the question, “What is the relationship, or distinctions, between: ‘What is?’, and ‘What could have been?'” It seemed to me that, ‘What is?’, is what is in the present condition, what is apparent now, the state in which a thing finds itself in the current moment. E.g. the fact that right now, I’m actively typing out this sentence by acting upon the keyboard. The question, “What could have been?”, presented an image in my mind of something that is inherent within each respective thing, but never realizing its potential. E.g. a man given gifts, and talents for a particular vocation, and never actually assuming that vocation. I took this question, and my interpretive examples, to the tutor who put the difference, between the two existential questions, into two simple terms:

“Actuality, and Potentiality.“

It makes sense now, what is actual, is what is now; and, what is potential, or what could be, is what something can become.

Finally, the last question was a mystery to me: “If the future is not known, then why does tense, idea, and expectation exist in a rational mind?” This was difficult for me to understand, would it not be more simple, perhaps less anxious to not have to deliberate about the future? Would there not be peace, and liberty in that? Or perhaps that is what it means to be irrational, to not be concerned with anything outside the present moment. Perhaps my own personal interaction with ‘what could be’ is disordered, due to my lack of reasoning to deliberate about the future logically. The tutor gave me the answer:

“The human mind, has the potentiality for posterior analytics.”

I don’t know what ‘posterior analytics’ means, but I look forward to learning how to do it. This gives me a lot of hope, and consolation for the future.

“I say, for instance, it is necessary, indeed, that there will be or will not be a naval engagement to-morrow, yet it is not necessary that there should be a naval engagement nor, nor that there should not be. It is necessary, however, that it should either be or not be.” – Aristotle

In XC, with Sts. Sebastian, Thomas Aquinas, & Bartolo Longo,

Eddie

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 10.

Enunciations, & distinctions; case-by-case.

Published on November 19, 2025

It seems that Aristotle is teaching us to be ever more sensitive to precision with enunciations. I suppose it all depends on what exactly we are speaking of. E.g. if I were to assert “Philosophers are wise; therefore, these two particular philosophers, are both wise.”, while looking at Aristotle, and say, Francis Bacon. Then it seems that we cannot ascertain the truth, or falsity, of such a general enunciation, about two particular people, by simple reasoning alone. I think Aristotle is teaching us to treat each enunciation on a case-by-case basis.

Let us then look at each philosopher particularly and rephrase each enunciation: “Aristotle is wise vs. Aristotle is not wise.”, and “Francis Bacon is wise vs. Francis Bacon is not wise.” Now we have two distinct enunciations where we can investigate the affirmation, and negation, for the truth, or falsity for each particular philosopher. It doesn’t seem like we would have ever come to each respective premise, for each subject, to start our investigation, had we just made our prior general enunciation, and simply left it at that. I suppose that if we are going to speak universally about things, then let it be universal in nature, and not assuming particular subjects can be assumed into a universal premise without distinction.

Still, concerning Aristotle, & Bacon, The Organon, & the Novum Organum: the following scripture verse comes to my mind concerning these two contrary philosophers:

“A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit. Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit, shall be cut down, and shall be cast into the fire. Wherefore by their fruits you shall know them.” (Matthew 7:18-20)

In XC, with Sts. Sebastian, & Bartolo Longo,

Eddie

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 8.

Universals, & quantifiers.

Published on November 18, 2025

There were many things from this lesson that were new. Things that seemed like we were splitting hairs on: e.g. universals enunciated universally, or not universally, affirmation being opposed to negation contradictorily, or contrarily, the impossibility of overlapping simultaneity between these conditions, and infinite inductive regression from a universal to what is universally predicated of it, etc. Yet, I think the most humbling part of this chapter, is realizing, very quickly, of the limitation of man’s mind to know what is, or is not, inherent within a universal without a quantifier preceding it.

Without the terms “every”, “some”, “none”, etc. preceding the universal subject, and the inherent attribute being examined, it seems that man cannot make a rational, coherent, precise, and definitive determination regarding the truth, or falsity, of any enunciation made by anyone, including ourselves. For example, to say: “Man is tall”, is immediately opposed in our minds by: “Man is not tall”; yet, neither idea can be confirmed, or denied. Both have a certain degree of truth in them, but may also not be true, depending on the context; but, to enunciate the universal without a quantifier seems to open up a door to nowhere. This principle, of a universal not being enunciated universally, seems to beg the man to speak rightly of things that can be known by the reason that has been given to him by God. Our Lord, and Savior, Jesus Christ’s exhortation to us on this, hits harder now, than it did upon my first reading of it:

“But let your speech be yea, yea: no, no: and that which is over and above these, is of evil.” (Matthew 5:37)

As I go further with this, I’m getting the impression that logic is not for the sloppy, or the faint of heart, this was a very difficult chapter to work through and humiliating to grapple with. The following verses keep coming to mind the further I go with Aristotle:

“For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain. For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things. And hardly do we guess aright at the things that are upon the earth: and with labour do we find the things that are before us. But the things that are in heaven, who shall search out?” (Wisdom of Solomon 9:14-16)

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 7.

A priori (causality), & its five modes.

Published on November 15, 2025

Aristotle commences this lesson concerning a priori and causality being of 5 modes:

The 1st being according to time: e.g. this is more ancient than that, this is older than that, etc.

The 2nd being according to discrete existence: e.g. 1 is prior to 2 but does not necessarily cause 2 to exist.

The 3rd being according to individual order: e.g. elements are prior to syllables in Grammar, proem is prior to the narration in discourses, etc.

The 4th being according to esteem: e.g. the married man holds his wife, and children, in higher esteem than a stranger.

The 5th being according to prior causality: e.g. the existing subject is the cause of, and is prior to, the true sentence asserting that it exists.

I think this lesson demonstrated to me my lack of command over the category named “relative”. I struggled to grapple with paragraph 7, which seemed to really hinge on reciprocation. I began to ask myself, “What reciprocates? The only thing I remember is relative from Aristotle, and peculiarity from Porphyry.” What made it more confusing is that he referred to mode 3, “For of those which reciprocate according to the consequence of existence (mode 3, above), that which is in any respect the cause of the existence of the one, may be justly said to be prior by nature.” Yet, this shared the same language as mode 2, “In the second place, [one thing is said to be prior to another,] because it does not reciprocate according to the consequence of existing.”

So, concerning causality, we have things that do, or do not reciprocate. Those things that do reciprocate, Aristotle is referring to Mode 3, which the priority is according to individual order; yet he makes no explicit mentioning of reciprocation. Now I’m asking myself, “Do parts within a demonstrative science reciprocate? So, assuming that the parts of a predicated science are prior, and not simultaneous: then, when we speak of syllables, do these parts automatically reciprocate in any direction of abstraction deductively to elements, or inductively to the potential science of Grammar, which encompasses these things, as a whole, since that is what we are assuming?” Indeed, I searched the entire book for all the instances where the term ‘reciprocate‘ is mentioned, and they are all clustered in chapters 7, 12 & 13. Perhaps I over did it in my inquiry, but I simply didn’t have the answer to my question; eventually, I gave in to asking the tutor, which confirmed that parts within a demonstrative science do not reciprocate. Even after the tutor’s answer, I still do not fully understand why does Aristotle refer to mode 3 as being of those things which reciprocate according to the consequence of existence? My missed questions on my first attempt of the quiz confirmed my confusion of the real difference between modes 2 and 5.

All that being said, I’ve learned that mode 5 is asserting that a subject is the cause of reciprocation with things said about it, and mode 2 is asserting there are things, being discrete in of themselves, that may indeed be prior to something sequential to it, yet do not cause reciprocation. Perhaps the answer will be in the next chapter, I see that Aristotle is talking about reciprocation and simultaneity. We’ll see, maybe that chapter will help me bridge the fragmented pictures I have of what I’ve learned so far. I have a feeling that the category relative could be the key to this art of reasoning.

EAR

Aristotle, Categories, Chapter 12.

Reciprocations, & natural simultaneity.

Published on November 15, 2025

An idea is forming in my mind about all this. I could be completely wrong on everything I’m about to say; but it seems as if all these different Categories are simply describing, and classifying, what is already naturally apparent to us. A relative seems to be subverted without a subject. A quality, or position, seem to be subverted when improperly attributed to a subject in question. A species that generates from a genus, could be subverted by the genus ceasing to exist.

I went back and reviewed chapter 7, concerning the category relative, and re-read Aristotle’s words, “Such things, however, are among the number of relative, such as habit, disposition, sense, science, position.” As I worked yesterday, I thought about each kind of relative, and tried to form my own ideas with any subject. E.g. I thought about how, reciprocation between the disposition, ‘illness’, and the subject, ‘cancer patient’, is true, and obviously reciprocates: if the disposition remains with the subject and does not change. The moment it changes, like if the patient miraculously recovers from the sickness, now the reciprocation no longer holds between the subject, and the disposition; thus, they are literally no longer relative to each other.

So, it seems that relative, being naturally simultaneous, is not the cause of anything, but simply an instantaneous state between a subject, and another category; of which a third-party person reasoning, and observing, can either affirm to be true, or false. Before, I was treating relative as if it were a kind of category that identifies a single idea on its own; however, it seems that relative is concerned with two ideas: namely, a subject, and a habit, disposition, sense, science, and position.

EAR

Aristotle, Categories, Chapter 13.

Mutations.

Published on November 15, 2025

This lesson was short, but unbelievably difficult to understand; and it did not open up for me until I fully understood what mutation actually was, and its implications. In order to find the answer, I had to go back to re-read every chapter containing the term: chapter 5 on substance, chapter 8 on quality, and chapter 10 concerning opposites. After doing so, I came back to chapter 24, paragraph 6 concerning contraries, and the outline of an idea began to form in my mind of what mutation according to place could mean. I made the raw assertion to the tutor that, “… it is physically moving from, or remaining at, a location.”

The tutor confirmed my reasoning, and referred me to Aristotle’s Physics, Book V, chapters 2 through 5, and Metaphysics Book XII, chapter 1, for further reading. I went down the rabbit hole and, admittedly, much of it was far beyond my current level of reasoning, and comprehension. However, I was able to scrounge up some helpful gems along the way. I did learn from Metaphysics that there are 3 types of motion: quality, quantity, and place; Aristotle says explicitly, “If, therefore, the categories are divided by substance, quality, place, action and passion, relation and quantity, it is necessary that there should be three motions, viz. of quality, of quantity, and of place.”

From Physics, I learned that generation, and corruption, were mutations into being, and non-being, respectively; again, the Philosopher says plainly, “… for mutation is more denominated from that into which, than from that from which it is moved; and on this account, corruption is a mutation into nonbeing; though also that which is corrupted is changed from being; and generation is a mutation into being, though it should be from non-being.” Learning these two ideas, were immensely helpful in being able to classify the 6 species of motion, into 4 classifications in my mind: generation with corruption being mutations of essence, increase with diminutions being mutations of quantity, variations being mutations of quality, and mutations with rest according to place referring to locomotion, or the absence thereof.

Having discovered all that, after more prayer, more re-readings out loud, and more walking contemplations: suddenly, today, I noticed in paragraph 7, that every time Aristotle mentioned “mutation of a quality”, he was speaking of the species of motion called variation. Thus, it seemed to me that variation is what is opposed to rest according to place, and mutation of quality into a contrary quality. So, all that being said, simply put, I have learned that:

Mutation is a kind of change, of which there are different kinds, depending on the predication being made, between a subject, and its particular motion.

EAR

Aristotle, Categories, Chapter 14.

Babbling according to human compact.

Published on November 14, 2025

The following enunciation jumped out at me, in my study of this chapter, “But all speech is, indeed, significant, not as an instrument (organon), but as we have said, according to human compact.” My immediate pondering was, “Why would speech, assuming it comes from the human voice, not be considered an instrument? Is it not the very instrument, through which communication can be intelligible? The voice produces sounds, which implies it causes some kind of speech.”

I contemplated the sentence, read it many times, tried to think outside the box that was being given, and eventually decided to test my reasoning with the tutor. I asked, “Is it the because the sounds do not mean anything without human compact? If so, then that would imply that no speech, can be known, prior to human compact taking place.” The tutor affirmed my thoughts on that enunciation made by Aristotle. I then abstracted that this could imply, further proof, that the “Tower of Babel” story from Genesis actually happened, and is not metaphorical, or allegorical. It seems that it would be reasonable, with this premise, to believe that all men at one point in time spoke the same language; however, God confused their prideful speech, to which then, if they wanted to survive, that event would have necessitated for them to come together, and agree on words by compact, in order to be able to communicate.

The second thing I could not understand immediately, was when he asserts, “Thus, for instance, a prayer, is, indeed, speech, but is neither true nor false.” I wondered why this would be. So again, I attempted an abstraction and reasoned with the tutor, “Perhaps, this is because in Aristotle’s time, prayer was subjective, and not objective due to the lack of divine revelation. It seems that prayer, at that time outside of Israel, would have been a supplication addressed to a reality that was not known, and outside of what could be reasoned with.” The tutor confirmed my answer as being reasonable, and coherent according to the source. This really makes me wonder at how it must have felt, to not know, what God has revealed to us modern men by grace; and, being blessed the credibility of truth concerning the Catholic Church, the sacraments, adoption as sons of God through baptism in Jesus Christ, etc. This makes me respect pre-Christian wise men all the more, now that I am immersed in their writings. What they did, to live virtuously, and reason at this level rationally, without the help of divine revelation, is extraordinary to think about.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 4.

Sophists & semantics.

Published on November 14, 2025

While I understood the basic meaning of what Aristotle asserts, “But I say, that the enunciation of the same thing is opposed synonymously, and not homonymously, or such other particulars of this kind, as we have concluded against the annoyances of the sophists.”, I could not immediately generate examples in my mind to demonstrate this principle to myself. “What does it mean to oppose one enunciation homonymously?” I would ask myself. Perhaps, because sophists do this, with the regular intention to deceive, I would reason that they must be quite proficient in their ability to switch the meaning of a term, mid-discourse, and run with that new meaning, while leaving the other poor soul completely behind, confused, and wondering what in the world just happened. With this in mind, I attempted to pretend to be a sophist, as absurd as it was to actively think in this way:

I could assert that, ‘the night is dark’, to which a sophist would oppose, ‘the knight is not dark’.

Or, perhaps I could assert, ‘all is well (meaning good)’, to which a sophist would oppose, ‘there is no well (meaning for water)’.

Or, perhaps I could assert, ‘it is to the right of here’, to which a sophist would oppose, ‘I have nowhere to write‘, etc.

I find it most amusing, that fools pretending to be wise, were what led to the rise of Aristotle, and his Organon; which seems to be scientifically, totally, and absolutely, concerned with destroying their deceptions, while simultaneously helping man, being a rational animal, to live according to how he was designed by God: by his reasoning.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 6.