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Tag: Metaphysics

Mutations.

Published on November 15, 2025

This lesson was short, but unbelievably difficult to understand; and it did not open up for me until I fully understood what mutation actually was, and its implications. In order to find the answer, I had to go back to re-read every chapter containing the term: chapter 5 on substance, chapter 8 on quality, and chapter 10 concerning opposites. After doing so, I came back to chapter 24, paragraph 6 concerning contraries, and the outline of an idea began to form in my mind of what mutation according to place could mean. I made the raw assertion to the tutor that, “… it is physically moving from, or remaining at, a location.”

The tutor confirmed my reasoning, and referred me to Aristotle’s Physics, Book V, chapters 2 through 5, and Metaphysics Book XII, chapter 1, for further reading. I went down the rabbit hole and, admittedly, much of it was far beyond my current level of reasoning, and comprehension. However, I was able to scrounge up some helpful gems along the way. I did learn from Metaphysics that there are 3 types of motion: quality, quantity, and place; Aristotle says explicitly, “If, therefore, the categories are divided by substance, quality, place, action and passion, relation and quantity, it is necessary that there should be three motions, viz. of quality, of quantity, and of place.”

From Physics, I learned that generation, and corruption, were mutations into being, and non-being, respectively; again, the Philosopher says plainly, “… for mutation is more denominated from that into which, than from that from which it is moved; and on this account, corruption is a mutation into nonbeing; though also that which is corrupted is changed from being; and generation is a mutation into being, though it should be from non-being.” Learning these two ideas, were immensely helpful in being able to classify the 6 species of motion, into 4 classifications in my mind: generation with corruption being mutations of essence, increase with diminutions being mutations of quantity, variations being mutations of quality, and mutations with rest according to place referring to locomotion, or the absence thereof.

Having discovered all that, after more prayer, more re-readings out loud, and more walking contemplations: suddenly, today, I noticed in paragraph 7, that every time Aristotle mentioned “mutation of a quality”, he was speaking of the species of motion called variation. Thus, it seemed to me that variation is what is opposed to rest according to place, and mutation of quality into a contrary quality. So, all that being said, simply put, I have learned that:

Mutation is a kind of change, of which there are different kinds, depending on the predication being made, between a subject, and its particular motion.

EAR

Aristotle, Categories, Chapter 14.

Babbling according to human compact.

Published on November 14, 2025

The following enunciation jumped out at me, in my study of this chapter, “But all speech is, indeed, significant, not as an instrument (organon), but as we have said, according to human compact.” My immediate pondering was, “Why would speech, assuming it comes from the human voice, not be considered an instrument? Is it not the very instrument, through which communication can be intelligible? The voice produces sounds, which implies it causes some kind of speech.”

I contemplated the sentence, read it many times, tried to think outside the box that was being given, and eventually decided to test my reasoning with the tutor. I asked, “Is it the because the sounds do not mean anything without human compact? If so, then that would imply that no speech, can be known, prior to human compact taking place.” The tutor affirmed my thoughts on that enunciation made by Aristotle. I then abstracted that this could imply, further proof, that the “Tower of Babel” story from Genesis actually happened, and is not metaphorical, or allegorical. It seems that it would be reasonable, with this premise, to believe that all men at one point in time spoke the same language; however, God confused their prideful speech, to which then, if they wanted to survive, that event would have necessitated for them to come together, and agree on words by compact, in order to be able to communicate. 

The second thing I could not understand immediately, was when he asserts, “Thus, for instance, a prayer, is, indeed, speech, but is neither true nor false.” I wondered why this would be. So again, I attempted an abstraction and reasoned with the tutor, “Perhaps, this is because in Aristotle’s time, prayer was subjective, and not objective due to the lack of divine revelation. It seems that prayer, at that time outside of Israel, would have been a supplication addressed to a reality that was not known, and outside of what could be reasoned with.” The tutor confirmed my answer as being reasonable, and coherent according to the source. This really makes me wonder at how it must have felt, to not know, what God has revealed to us modern men by grace; and, being blessed the credibility of truth concerning the Catholic Church, the sacraments, adoption as sons of God through baptism in Jesus Christ, etc. This makes me respect pre-Christian wise men all the more, now that I am immersed in their writings. What they did, to live virtuously, and reason at this level rationally, without the help of divine revelation, is extraordinary to think about.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 4.

Sophists & semantics.

Published on November 14, 2025

While I understood the basic meaning of what Aristotle asserts, “But I say, that the enunciation of the same thing is opposed synonymously, and not homonymously, or such other particulars of this kind, as we have concluded against the annoyances of the sophists.”, I could not immediately generate examples in my mind to demonstrate this principle to myself. “What does it mean to oppose one enunciation homonymously?” I would ask myself. Perhaps, because sophists do this, with the regular intention to deceive, I would reason that they must be quite proficient in their ability to switch the meaning of a term, mid-discourse, and run with that new meaning, while leaving the other poor soul completely behind, confused, and wondering what in the world just happened. With this in mind, I attempted to pretend to be a sophist, as absurd as it was to actively think in this way:

I could assert that, ‘the night is dark’, to which a sophist would oppose, ‘the knight is not dark’.

Or, perhaps I could assert, ‘all is well (meaning good)’, to which a sophist would oppose, ‘there is no well (meaning for water)’.

Or, perhaps I could assert, ‘it is to the right of here’, to which a sophist would oppose, ‘I have nowhere to write‘, etc.

I find it most amusing, that fools pretending to be wise, were what led to the rise of Aristotle, and his Organon; which seems to be scientifically, totally, and absolutely, concerned with destroying their deceptions, while simultaneously helping man, being a rational animal, to live according to how he was designed by God: by his reasoning.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 6.

The a priori of affirmation.

Published on November 14, 2025

An invitation to ponder entered my mind when I read what Aristotle first asserts in the beginning of the chapter, “First affirmation, then negation, is one enunciative speech.” I asked myself, “Why is affirmation first?” It seemed to me, that the Philosopher was implying, that if we begin with a negative assertion about something, or someone, we cannot know the truth, or the falsity of the premise at all to begin with.

I wondered to the tutor that if this is because, “… negation, being relative to affirmation, cannot stand alone without being at risk, and subject to an indefinite metaphysical reality, and contradictions.” The tutor affirmed my assertion as being logically sound and then opened up my mind to something I was not seeing before. That affirmation, and negation, once made from an enunciation, can each then be respectively examined for truth, or falsity. This was a profound moment for me, because I was treating affirmation with truth, and negation with falsehood, as synonymous terms, or perhaps far too generally in my mind; therefore, my command over their distinctions in application was getting very muddied while attempting to employ their use with my own reasoning.

I can’t help but now wonder at the implications of this with other topics I hear all around me in my own personal life, at work, at home, in public, on the news, in the Church, etc. It seems as if I hear a lot of negative enunciations ad nauseum: e.g. “this team is not pulling their weight”, “this man is not good”, “this President is not my President”, “the Pope is not the successor to Peter”, “the Eucharist is not Jesus”, etc. Ecclesiastes 1:15, and 10:20 come to mind, and I am certainly guilty of falling into both categories, especially prior to my studies with Aristotle.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 5.