Tag: On Interpretation

Necessity.

Published on December 31, 2025

What is necessary seems to be a convergence point for the intellect to enter into, in order to be transfigured by what is in energy, in order to be at rest and at peace. I.e., what is necessary is what happens right now. What is priority is right now. What happened before, or what could happen later, are useful to know, in moderation. It seems to me that an unhinged, wild mind is incapable of resting in what is in energy now and is tormented by what was or what could be. Perhaps without training in Prior or Posterior Analytics, there would be no possibility of a human mind, naturally predisposed for analysis, to escape this inevitable fate of insanity. This seems to be the great parody of the human rational faculty. Indeed, it might be the reason why some, by consequence of their decisions as new independent and young adults, suddenly find themselves distracted by various earthly things in order to relieve themselves of the potency of insanity by way of unhinged abstractions.

Therefore, I think peace seems to be tied to what is necessary right now; yet, to defend that peace, I think one needs to be trained in how to properly deal with what was and what could be. Having both of these—a condition of being present while being absolutely capable of entering into inductive or deductive abstraction, regressively or progressively to deal with whatever comes—is essential to living in the way we were designed to.

EAR

Deception.

Published on December 14, 2025

The seventh passage from this final chapter of On Interpretation was very subtle. I nearly glossed over and missed what Aristotle was conveying here about deception. The passage was very short, he says: “But in those things in which there is deception [contraries are to be admitted]; and these are things from which there are generations. Generations, however, are from opposites; and, therefore, deceptions also.” In my mind, I immediately recalled that generation is motion away from what was. As I abstracted, I imagined something becoming something else, like a baby becoming an adult.

Deception, in the way that Aristotle put it, seemed to go in the opposite direction, as if there was an induction happening. So, what is now, the reality, is being asserted as the same as what it was, or what it never was. Using that same image before, it’s as if to assert:
“The adult is a baby”. I took this interpretation to the tutor: “Concerning deception, it seems that generation is opposed to what was, and therefore the distance between the two contraries is apparent to all; but deception seems to be the assertion of a contrary inductively under the other contrary and being of the opinion that they are univocal, when they are actually equivocal.”

The tutor confirmed my interpretation as aligning well with Aristotle and added that sophistical fallacies blur the distance between contraries, thereby obscuring reality. I came up with examples to demonstrate this deception being employed: “astrology is astronomy”, “abortions are equal rights”, “witchcraft is natural philosophy”, “communism is social justice”, “capitalism is charity”, “affairs are love”, etc.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 14.

Fire, & first essences.

Published on December 13, 2025

The end of this chapter seems to be an invitation for deeper ponderings about: ‘what was’, ‘what is’, and ‘what could be’. Firstly, Aristotle’s demonstration of what fire is, that it is: an irrational power, with no will to affect any kind of opposite contrary to its nature, and a first essence. It is quite different for me to invert my direction of abstraction concerning this. I’ve always assumed, with respect to fire, that it is what heats other things. It would seem that such an enunciation would be common sense. However, on the contrary, according to Aristotle, it seems that any mutation suffered by others in proximity to fire, is not because fire has the power of heating, but because other things have the power to be heated, or rather to suffer being heated. This is a very different way of looking at a subject’s relationship with an irrational power.

Also, the implication of there being a first essence provokes a deep pondering with me. The question that came to my mind was: “What other first essences are there?” If fire is one, then another must be something that is also elemental in nature. The first that came to my mind was water, but I wasn’t confident if perhaps air, and earth would also be among these too. I took these to the tutor, who confirmed my thoughts, but took them further: “While [these] four elements are foundational as first essences of sensible bodies, Aristotle also discusses: eternal essences, immovable essences, mathematical forms, numbers, intelligible essences, principles of change, etc.”

I’m left at an impasse at this point, with more questions that I don’t have answers to: “What energized these first essences? Do these irrational powers mix compositely in any kind of way? Do they lose their essential distinctions at any point? Can they experience mutation, and if so, do they merely become one of the other first essences?”

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 13.

“It is not necessary not to be.”

Published on December 5, 2025

The content presented in this lesson was fairly difficult, but straightforward; however, the implications of what was being said, with regards of nuanced additions to verbs, was extremely subtle, perhaps too deep, and fine, at this point for me to abstract on with any hope of staying rooted to reality. I suppose it will become clearer in the next few chapters, maybe more examples, and demonstrations, will be provided. We’ll see.

Firstly, this jumped out at me from Aristotle, “In a similar manner of this [enunciation] it is necessary to be, the negation is not this, it is necessary not to be, [the negation] is this, it is not necessary not to be.” I asked myself, and the tutor, “Why is this different from the rule that affirmations and negations center around the verb, with the subject’s positive or negative condition? Why is this different from the other enunciations? Is it because if something is ‘to be’, then it was by necessary causes? Likewise, if it was ‘not to be’, then it was not necessary for any prior causes to generate what never existed in the first place?”

The tutor explained that my interpretation was in line with Aristotle, but qualified it further, “‘Necessary’ in the absolute sense is connected to prior causality… Conversely, ‘necessary not to be’ would indicate absolute impossibility or absence of prior causality for existence… Between these extremes lies contingency, which Aristotle expresses logically as ‘not necessary not to be.’ Contingent things are neither necessarily existent nor necessarily non-existent.”

So, I am now perceiving the past and present conditions as being necessary; and what is not necessary, as being open to the future. I don’t fully understand what this all means, it’s like seeing an island on the horizon while out at sea; but, not seeing that island up close, in full focus, and with full understanding of what it is that you are looking at.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 12.

The hinge.

Published on November 29, 2025

In this chapter, Aristotle speaks of the primary substance being a composite of predicates, the essences of which are apparent of the subject, and while each can be affirmed of the substance individually, they retain their distinction essentially; and, while the particulars are accidental to the substance itself, they are, like the predicates, distinct from other particulars, and not accidental to each other.

What is the implication here? It seems that we keep returning to what was taught in the Categories, that nothing holds, or makes any sense without the primary substance. I think Aristotle is implying that if we are talking of essential things, then we are merely defining the subject in question, but if we are talking of particular things, then we are describing that same subject in motion. None of the particulars seem to make any sense without the subject, and certainly truth cannot be found without the noun. Likewise, none of the essentials seem to make sense without a subject either. I tried to abstract and imagine these predicates, and particulars, detached from the primary substance, and simply could not do it. My intellect is unable to see the genus animal without thinking of a species within it; and, I cannot imagine an attribute, like running, being removed from some kind of substance to animate the action. Inductively starting from the particulars leads to infinite possibilities, and deductively starting from the predicates leads to an indefinite mess of forms that are not distinct.

My mind is seeing the substance as a kind of hinge, or convergence point where the defining predicates, and describing particulars, seem to exist instantaneously as the substance does:

They don’t seem to flow into, or flow out from the substance. What is generated, or corrupted of the substance seems to existentially, and directly, effect both predicates and particulars. As we speak of these things, I reason that interpreting what is apparent of what we speak of, is knowing rightly what can be said of it, or about it.

E.g. “What is this animal? A Tiger. Where is it? In the wild. Doing what? Hunting for prey. When did you see it? Yesterday. So, now we have something to ascertain the truth of viz. ‘yesterday, we saw a tiger in the wild, hunting for prey’. If you subvert the tiger, then ‘yesterday’, ‘wild’, ‘hunting for prey’ are no longer apparent and subverted.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation. Chapter 11.

Deduction, & Induction.

Published on November 23, 2025

This lesson was fairly straightforward as I analyzed the different logical forms of enunciations, their oppositions, etc. However, as I proceeded toward the end of the chapter, the following question came to my mind: “Is there not a universally assumed universal enunciation that is logical and true?” I stopped what I was doing and attempted to abstract in different ways to find my own example. However, it seemed like the moment I put the term “every”, or “all” in front of the subject, the logical coherence, of what I was about to assert with respect to the theoretical predicate, fell apart in pieces. I tried many different things: “Every cloud is grey. False, some clouds are white.”, “Every bird flies. False, some birds can’t fly.”, “Every star gives light. False, some stars are dead.”, and it went on, and on. Finally, I came to the only thing I could think of, “all demons are evil”. I took to this to the tutor, who responded, “evil is the privation of something originally good; therefore, demons were once angels, created for good, who then deprived themselves of their originally good nature. This is a nuanced inquiry that belongs to St. Thomas Aquinas rather than Aristotle.”

I responded: “Then, there is no universally assumed universal enunciation that is true. It’s impossible to demonstrate an example, and nothing works.” The tutor answered:

“That is not true, for example: all men are mortal.”

This is true, all men are indeed mortal. Then it hit me, I suddenly realized that this whole time, I was trying to universally assume particulars to universals, which is obviously irrational; because, if something is particular, then surely it can be assumed that what is particular is infinite in potentiality. So, then my mind switched to inductive abstractions, and I saw the difference: “Every man is a substance. True.”, “Every tree is a living body. True.”, “Every intellect, and every angel is incorporeal. True, and true.”

“A wise heart shall acquire knowledge: and the ear of the wise seeketh instruction.” – Proverbs 18:15

In XC, with Sts. Sebastian, Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great & Bartolo Longo,

Eddie

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 11.

To be, or not to be.

Published on November 22, 2025

This was a mind-bending chapter, that seemed to stretch my intellect above, beyond, and through my prior limitations, and comprehensions.

Firstly, the question, “What is the relationship, or distinctions, between: ‘What is?’, and ‘What could have been?'” It seemed to me that, ‘What is?’, is what is in the present condition, what is apparent now, the state in which a thing finds itself in the current moment. E.g. the fact that right now, I’m actively typing out this sentence by acting upon the keyboard. The question, “What could have been?”, presented an image in my mind of something that is inherent within each respective thing, but never realizing its potential. E.g. a man given gifts, and talents for a particular vocation, and never actually assuming that vocation. I took this question, and my interpretive examples, to the tutor who put the difference, between the two existential questions, into two simple terms:

“Actuality, and Potentiality.“

It makes sense now, what is actual, is what is now; and, what is potential, or what could be, is what something can become.

Finally, the last question was a mystery to me: “If the future is not known, then why does tense, idea, and expectation exist in a rational mind?” This was difficult for me to understand, would it not be more simple, perhaps less anxious to not have to deliberate about the future? Would there not be peace, and liberty in that? Or perhaps that is what it means to be irrational, to not be concerned with anything outside the present moment. Perhaps my own personal interaction with ‘what could be’ is disordered, due to my lack of reasoning to deliberate about the future logically. The tutor gave me the answer:

“The human mind, has the potentiality for posterior analytics.”

I don’t know what ‘posterior analytics’ means, but I look forward to learning how to do it. This gives me a lot of hope, and consolation for the future.

“I say, for instance, it is necessary, indeed, that there will be or will not be a naval engagement to-morrow, yet it is not necessary that there should be a naval engagement nor, nor that there should not be. It is necessary, however, that it should either be or not be.” – Aristotle

In XC, with Sts. Sebastian, Thomas Aquinas, & Bartolo Longo,

Eddie

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 10.

Enunciations, & distinctions; case-by-case.

Published on November 19, 2025

It seems that Aristotle is teaching us to be ever more sensitive to precision with enunciations. I suppose it all depends on what exactly we are speaking of. E.g. if I were to assert “Philosophers are wise; therefore, these two particular philosophers, are both wise.”, while looking at Aristotle, and say, Francis Bacon. Then it seems that we cannot ascertain the truth, or falsity, of such a general enunciation, about two particular people, by simple reasoning alone. I think Aristotle is teaching us to treat each enunciation on a case-by-case basis.

Let us then look at each philosopher particularly and rephrase each enunciation: “Aristotle is wise vs. Aristotle is not wise.”, and “Francis Bacon is wise vs. Francis Bacon is not wise.” Now we have two distinct enunciations where we can investigate the affirmation, and negation, for the truth, or falsity for each particular philosopher. It doesn’t seem like we would have ever come to each respective premise, for each subject, to start our investigation, had we just made our prior general enunciation, and simply left it at that. I suppose that if we are going to speak universally about things, then let it be universal in nature, and not assuming particular subjects can be assumed into a universal premise without distinction.

Still, concerning Aristotle, & Bacon, The Organon, & the Novum Organum: the following scripture verse comes to my mind concerning these two contrary philosophers:

“A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit. Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit, shall be cut down, and shall be cast into the fire. Wherefore by their fruits you shall know them.” (Matthew 7:18-20)

In XC, with Sts. Sebastian, & Bartolo Longo,

Eddie

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 8.

Universals, & quantifiers.

Published on November 18, 2025

There were many things from this lesson that were new. Things that seemed like we were splitting hairs on: e.g. universals enunciated universally, or not universally, affirmation being opposed to negation contradictorily, or contrarily, the impossibility of overlapping simultaneity between these conditions, and infinite inductive regression from a universal to what is universally predicated of it, etc. Yet, I think the most humbling part of this chapter, is realizing, very quickly, of the limitation of man’s mind to know what is, or is not, inherent within a universal without a quantifier preceding it.

Without the terms “every”, “some”, “none”, etc. preceding the universal subject, and the inherent attribute being examined, it seems that man cannot make a rational, coherent, precise, and definitive determination regarding the truth, or falsity, of any enunciation made by anyone, including ourselves. For example, to say: “Man is tall”, is immediately opposed in our minds by: “Man is not tall”; yet, neither idea can be confirmed, or denied. Both have a certain degree of truth in them, but may also not be true, depending on the context; but, to enunciate the universal without a quantifier seems to open up a door to nowhere. This principle, of a universal not being enunciated universally, seems to beg the man to speak rightly of things that can be known by the reason that has been given to him by God. Our Lord, and Savior, Jesus Christ’s exhortation to us on this, hits harder now, than it did upon my first reading of it:

“But let your speech be yea, yea: no, no: and that which is over and above these, is of evil.” (Matthew 5:37)

As I go further with this, I’m getting the impression that logic is not for the sloppy, or the faint of heart, this was a very difficult chapter to work through and humiliating to grapple with. The following verses keep coming to mind the further I go with Aristotle:

“For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain. For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things. And hardly do we guess aright at the things that are upon the earth: and with labour do we find the things that are before us. But the things that are in heaven, who shall search out?” (Wisdom of Solomon 9:14-16)

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 7.

Babbling according to human compact.

Published on November 14, 2025

The following enunciation jumped out at me, in my study of this chapter, “But all speech is, indeed, significant, not as an instrument (organon), but as we have said, according to human compact.” My immediate pondering was, “Why would speech, assuming it comes from the human voice, not be considered an instrument? Is it not the very instrument, through which communication can be intelligible? The voice produces sounds, which implies it causes some kind of speech.”

I contemplated the sentence, read it many times, tried to think outside the box that was being given, and eventually decided to test my reasoning with the tutor. I asked, “Is it the because the sounds do not mean anything without human compact? If so, then that would imply that no speech, can be known, prior to human compact taking place.” The tutor affirmed my thoughts on that enunciation made by Aristotle. I then abstracted that this could imply, further proof, that the “Tower of Babel” story from Genesis actually happened, and is not metaphorical, or allegorical. It seems that it would be reasonable, with this premise, to believe that all men at one point in time spoke the same language; however, God confused their prideful speech, to which then, if they wanted to survive, that event would have necessitated for them to come together, and agree on words by compact, in order to be able to communicate.

The second thing I could not understand immediately, was when he asserts, “Thus, for instance, a prayer, is, indeed, speech, but is neither true nor false.” I wondered why this would be. So again, I attempted an abstraction and reasoned with the tutor, “Perhaps, this is because in Aristotle’s time, prayer was subjective, and not objective due to the lack of divine revelation. It seems that prayer, at that time outside of Israel, would have been a supplication addressed to a reality that was not known, and outside of what could be reasoned with.” The tutor confirmed my answer as being reasonable, and coherent according to the source. This really makes me wonder at how it must have felt, to not know, what God has revealed to us modern men by grace; and, being blessed the credibility of truth concerning the Catholic Church, the sacraments, adoption as sons of God through baptism in Jesus Christ, etc. This makes me respect pre-Christian wise men all the more, now that I am immersed in their writings. What they did, to live virtuously, and reason at this level rationally, without the help of divine revelation, is extraordinary to think about.

EAR

Aristotle, On Interpretation, Chapter 4.